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Affirmative Action Awash in
Confusion: Backward-LookingFuture-Oriented Justifications for
Race-Conscious Measures
Ann C. McGinley*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, decided
Taxman v. Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway,' in
August 1996. Eight judges agreed that the Board of Education of
Piscataway Township, New Jersey violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act 2 by using race, in accordance with its affirmative action
policy, to break a tie between two teachers in the Business Department at Piscataway High School when determining which teacher
*

Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law; J.D.,

1982, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I wish to thank the Roger Williams
University Law Review as well as Professor Michael Yelnosky for inviting me to
contribute to this project. I also thank my colleagues Nat Stern and Jeff Stempel
for commenting on an earlier draft of this article, Mary McCormick and Trish Simonds for library support, and J. Bart McNiel for research assistance.
1. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1994). In relevant part, Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin;
or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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to lay off.3 A strong dissent by Chief Judge Sloviter was joined by
two other Court of Appeals judges. 4 The majority decision is remarkable in its breadth, concluding that Title VII permits racebased decision-making only for the narrow purpose of remedying
the present effects of past discrimination.5 This reading of Title
VII strongly implies that Title VII may limit a public institution's
race-based decision-making beyond the limitations imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 Not one
Supreme Court Justice has ever articulated this position before.
In fact, the Court in Johnson v. TransportationAgency 7 concluded
that Title VII gave greater latitude to public employers to use racebased voluntary affirmative action measures than did the Equal
Protection Clause.8 In Taxman, the Board of Education petitioned
for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted on June 26, 1997.
A number of curious happenings demonstrate the political importance of the case. These include the amount of press coverage
accorded to the case, 9 the remarkable settlement that avoided
Supreme Court review 10 and the flip-flopping of the United States
government's position on the case."
The case, which was scheduled for oral argument in January,
1998, settled on November 21, 1997.12 Remarkably, civil rights organizations, in particular, the Black Leadership Forum, concerned
that the case could make bad precedent and virtually abolish af3. The Board of Education voted to retain Debra Williams, the only Black
teacher in the Business Department at Piscataway High School and to lay off
Sharon Taxman, her White counterpart, to whom Williams was equal in seniority
and qualifications. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
4. See id. at 1567.
5. See id. at 1560 ("[Slocietal discrimination alone will not justify a racial
classification... evidence of prior discrimination... must be presented ...
6. See id. at 1559.
7. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
8. See id. at 630.
9. See Malcolm Gladwell, Testing the Limits of Affirmative Action, Wash.
Post, Sept. 25, 1994, at A4, available in 1994 WL 2441447; see also Associated
Press, Supreme Court to Take up Affirmative Action Issues, Chi. Trib., Sept. 28,
1997, available in 1997 WL 3593357 (discussing how the Taxman case awaited
Supreme Court Justices at the start of the new term).
10. See Joan Biskupic, Rights Groups Pay to Settle Bias Case, Wash. Post,
Nov. 22, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 14714386.
11. See Associated Press, White House Reverses on N.J. Diversity Case, Chi.
Trib., Aug. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 3581168.
12. See Biskupic, supra note 10, at Al.
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firmative action programs, contributed significant funds to settle
13
the case.
The role of the federal government in this case was also
unique. Originally the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed the suit against the Board of Education, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII, but
Sharon Taxman intervened. Both the EEOC and Taxman filed
motions for partial summary judgment, which the district court
granted. On the issue of damages, the jury awarded over $144,000
to Sharon Taxman.
The Board of Education appealed to the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. The United States, shifting sides, moved to file a brief
supporting the position of the Board of Education, stating that it
could no longer support the judgment of the trial court. The Court
of Appeals permitted the United States to withdraw as a party, but
denied the government's motion to file an amicus brief on appel14
lant's behalf.
The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment. The
Board of Education petitioned for a writ of certiorari; the United
States Justice Department filed a brief in opposition to the petition
for certiorari. On June 27, 1997 the United States Supreme Court
granted the writ of certiorari. 1 The Solicitor General of the
United States filed a Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
in which the government argued for affirmance of the Court of Appeals holding, but took issue with the court's reasoning that all
non-remedial, race-conscious employment decisions are illegal
under Title VII.16
At the announcement of the settlement I felt contradictory
emotions: relief and disappointment. I was relieved that there
would be no opportunity for the Supreme Court to abolish affirmative action. I was doubly disappointed, however, because I believed
13. The Black Leadership Forum contributed $300,000 of the total settlement
of $433,500. See Abby Goodnough, FinancialDetails are Revealed in Affirmative
Action Settlement, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1997, at B5, available in 1997 WL 8015411.
14. See Joint Appendix at 29, Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679).
15. See Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 117 S. Ct. 2506, 2506
(1997).
16. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 4,
Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No.
96-679), available in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
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that Taxman presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
eschew the broad simplistic approach to affirmative action that the
Fourth, 17 Fifth' s and now, the Third, Circuit Courts of Appeals
had taken. If given the opportunity to decide an affirmative action
case, the Supreme Court, I believed, would not deal a mortal blow
to affirmative action, but would arrive at a middle ground that opponents and proponents of affirmative action could accept.
It was with this mindset that I approached this project. My
role as a participant in this project was twofold. First, I was to
assume that Taxman had not settled and that the Court had overturned the Third Circuit's decision. Based on this assumption, I
was to write the Court's opinion, overturning the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals decision and any concurring or dissenting opinions. While writing the opinions, I tried to anticipate how the Justices would decide the case without interijecting my own views into
the opinions. I have reviewed the record and briefs of the parties
and amici and the affirmative action cases decided by the Supreme
Court under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, parsing
each Justice's view toward affirmative action. I have tried to be
faithful to each Justice's view toward affirmative action, procedural issues, employment discrimination, and education law.
My second contribution to the project was to write this commentary, explaining the choices I faced. This assignment gives me
leeway to examine how this case looks through the eyes of a
Supreme Court Justice and to discuss my own views concerning its
substance and procedure. Besides piquing my interest as a legal
scholar, this task also raised pedagogical issues about teaching future lawyers. For a short time, I stepped into the shoes of a
Supreme Court Justice to see what strategies were successful and
unsuccessful. I will try to share with my readers those perspectives as I go along.
A number of fascinating issues arose. They included questions
concerning the facts of the case, the respective burdens of proof,
summary judgment law, the proper interpretation of Title VII, the
interplay between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, the
various meanings of "remedial" purpose, whether a non-remedial
purpose was sufficient for race-based decision-making under Title
17.
18.

See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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VII, whether employment discrimination law differs in an educational setting, whether a layoff rather than a hiring decision would
make a difference affecting the outcome, the changing political focus of the federal courts and institutional competence.
Although any one of these matters would provide substance
for a separate law review article, I will attempt briefly to address
these issues and to raise questions that I hope others will develop.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

After discovery, the Board of Education moved for summary
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.19 The United
States and Sharon Taxman both cross-moved for partial summary
judgment on liability and the parties stipulated to the factual record. The federal district court denied the Board of Education's motion and granted the motion of Sharon Taxman and the United
States. The court then held a jury trial on damages.
The parties stipulated that both Ms. Taxman and Ms. Williams were equal in seniority and qualifications. The lower courts
assumed these facts when making their rulings. Oddly, the brief
for Sharon Taxman before the Supreme Court argued, however,
20
that Ms. Taxman was better qualified than Ms. Williams.
Although as a Supreme Court Justice I could not consider factual
arguments raised for the first time before the Supreme Court, I
found these arguments both unsettling and confusing. It appeared
that Sharon Taxman may have had more experience teaching upper level business courses than Ms. Williams, but these facts were
not a part of the record. 2 1 I was concerned that the attorney for
Ms. Taxman was trying to influence the result by bringing up facts
that the Supreme Court should not consider. I was also concerned
19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides in pertinent part: "A party
seeking to recover upon a claim... may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days

from the commencement of the action... move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
20. See Brief for Respondent at 2 n.2, Board of Education of the Township of
Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679), available in LEXIS,
1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
21. It also appears that Debra Williams had a graduate degree, but Sharon
Taxman did not, raising the question once again whether they were equal. See
Winners and Losers in Piscataway, Wash. Post, Dec 8, 1997, at A18, available in
1997 WL 16222802.
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that perhaps the case before the Supreme Court did not represent
the true facts.
Another unusual factual issue arose from representations
made in the Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits. Although all of
the facts relied on by the lower courts stated that the Board of Education had considered the school district's affirmative action policy when making its decision to retain Ms. Williams, the
Petitioner's Reply Brief argued that the Board of Education may
not have acted pursuant to the affirmative action policy.2 2 I found
this argument odd since it seemed to contradict all of the evidence
on the record. Moreover, I tried to consider the petitioner's lawyers' strategy for making this point. Evidently, the lawyers were
uncomfortable defending the affirmative action policy itself because it was somewhat general and amorphous and contained no
specific end-date. 2 3 This failure could harm their client since the
Court in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,2 4 upheld the affirmative action plan, in part, because it was a temporary mea22. See Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 17, Board of Education of the
Township of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679), available
in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
23. The policy states:
PISCATAWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION
Piscataway, NJ
Policy 4111.1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
PURPOSE:
This policy ensures equal employment opportunity and prohibits discrimination in employment because of sex, race, color, creed, religion, handicap, domicile, marital status or national origin. In all cases, the most
qualified candidate will be recommended for appointment. However,
when candidates appear to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting
the criteria of the Affirmative Action Program will be recommended.
BASIC POLICY:
The Superintendent of Schools shall implement a program of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. This program shall be an
integral part of every aspect of employment including upgrading positions, demotions, transfers, recruitment, recruitment advertising, layoffs,
benefits, selection for training, promotions and tenure.
Joint Appendix at 269, Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v.
Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679).
24. 443 U.S. 193, 199, 209 (1979) (upholding an affirmative action plan under
Title VII that set up a training program entitling 50% of the participants to be
Black and 50% White instead of solely using seniority for entrance requirement).
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sure. 25 The Board of Education attempted instead to defend the
particular decision in the case. Although this may have been a viable strategy in the earlier stages of the litigation, its adoption
before the Supreme Court raised questions in my mind.
These questions were heightened by the procedural posture of
the case and the burdens of persuasion and production in an affirmative action case. In Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 2 6 the
Court held that the familiar McDonnell Douglas2 7 approach applies to affirmative action cases. 28 Under McDonnell Douglas, the
plaintiff proves a prima facie case by raising an inference of discrimination; the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
"articulate a nondiscriminatory rationale" for its employment decision; finally the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff
and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that
the employer's articulated reason is a pretext for discrimination. 29
In the affirmative action context, the Court has adapted this
method by requiring the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case by
demonstrating that the defendant took race or gender into account. 30 Next, the burden of production shifts to the employer to
raise its affirmative action plan as a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for its actions.3 1 Finally the burden of production shifts
back to the plaintiff and merges with the plaintiffs ultimate burden to prove that the employer's reason is pretextual.3 2 The plaintiff could prove "pretext" by demonstrating that the employer had
not operated in response to a valid affirmative action plan.33
Although Johnson does not clarify this point, presumably, pretext in the affirmative action context can be proved in at least two
ways: 1) by demonstrating that the plan itself is invalid because its
purpose is illegitimate or it unduly trammels the interests of nonminorities, or 2) by demonstrating that although the plan as writ25. See id. at 208-09.

26. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
28. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27.
29. Id. For a thorough explanation of the McDonnell Douglas approach, see
Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 203, 214-21
(1993).
30. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
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ten is valid, it is invalid as applied in the case. 34 This raises another question. What if the plan as written is overly broad, but is
legal as applied?
Here the School Board could argue that even if the policy as
written would not generally be valid, it is valid as applied. This
argument may succeed here because the record undisputably
shows that Taxman's layoff represented the first time that the
Board of Education had invoked the affirmative action policy in an
individual personnel decision. In other words, although the plan is
general and amorphous, and may grant excessive discretion to the
Board of Education, the Board has judiciously exercised its discretion by invoking the plan only in this one case. Under Johnson, it
would be the plaintiffs burden to prove that the policy as applied is
illegal.
There is a serious question, however, of whether the McDonnell Douglas method should apply to affirmative action cases when
it does not comport with the other uses of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. McDonnell Douglas is used to prove discrimination by
the indirect method, where there is circumstantial evidence of discrimination, but no direct evidence of discrimination.3 5 In the affirmative action context, the plaintiff will usually have direct
evidence that a protected characteristic was the reason for the employment decision. In this case, for example, the Board of Education sent a letter dated May 22, 1989, to Sharon Taxman, telling
her that it had decided to "rely on its commitment to affirmative
action as a means of breaking the tie in seniority entitlement in
the secretarial studies category." 36 This letter is direct evidence
that the Board of Education considered race when making its layoff decision. Under Title VII if there is evidence, direct or otherwise, showing that the protected characteristic is a motivating
factor in the employment practice, the defendant is normally liable
for discrimination. 3 7 The court may limit a defendant's liability to
attorneys fees and injunctive relief if the defendant shows that it
would have made the decision in the absence of the illegal rea34. See, e.g., id. at 630-31.
35. See McGinley, supra note 29, at 213-17.
36. Joint Appendix at 153, Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway
v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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son.38 This provision, however, added to the Act in 1991, should
not be applied to affirmative action cases. 39 Congress passed this
provision in response to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins40 to expand
upon the rights of plaintiffs who prove that a defendant considered
gender or race when making an employment decision. 4 1 It was
not, however, intended to limit voluntary affirmative action poli42
cies in any way.

Because of the Congressional purpose in passing this section,
it would distort the law to apply it to cases where the employer
relied in good faith on an affirmative action policy to make the employment decision. By the same token, however, requiring the
plaintiff to bear the burden of proving the invalidity of the plan, as
written or as applied, is inconsistent with the other uses of McDonnell Douglas and may make little sense. Reliance on a valid affirmative action plan resembles an affirmative defense that the
employer should plead and prove because the employer has better
access to the information about the plan and the decision-making
process.
Possibly because of the confusing state of the law in this area,
the question of the burdens did not arise in the parties' briefs. I
assumed, therefore, that Johnson's discussion about burdens of
persuasion and production was still good law under Title VII.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's mock opinion relies, in part, on this burden and on the procedural posture of the case-decided on a summary judgment motion brought by the party with the burden of
persuasion. Presumably, this burden should be a very heavy
one.

43

I was further troubled by Petitioner's argument that the respondent had switched positions before the Supreme Court. According to Petitioner, the trial court had viewed the Respondent's
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
39. Moreover, it appears that the parties did not rely in any way on this provision in this case.
40. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
41. For a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of this provision, see
Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26 Conn. L. Rev. 145, 187-93 (1993).
42. Amendments to the Act were not intended to affect affirmative action. See
infra note 62.
43. For a discussion of burdens of production and persuasion in a Title VII
case where a Rule 56 motion is filed, see McGinley, supra note 29, at 203.
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motion for partial summary judgment as raising a question of law
testing whether an affirmative action policy with a non-remedial
purpose could ever be legal under Title VII. 4 For this reason, the
trial court imposed limitations on the Board of Education's presentation of factual disputes and the court did not consider the facts
that were in the record. 45 For example, the Petitioner argued that
a diverse faculty reduced discrimination against minority students
in schools. 4 6 The trial judge ignored this proffer, concluding that
even if factually supported, the purpose the petitioner gave for con47
sidering race-a diverse faculty-was illegal.
Although the plaintiff had argued in her motion for partial
summary judgment that the lower court should grant the motion
as a matter of law, before the Supreme Court she faulted the Board
of Education for failing to present facts justifying its interest in
maintaining a diverse faculty.48 These arguments raised questions about the fairness of the procedures in the lower court and
whether a full factual record could render a different result. I believe for three reasons that Justice O'Connor might conclude that
more factual development is necessary: 1) her discussion of the
burdens in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,49 2) her definition of "strict scrutiny" in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,50
which seems to assume the necessity of factual findings by the district court and 3) the social science research presented in amicus
curiae briefs by the National Education Association and American
Council on Education concluding that a more diverse faculty
reduces stereotyping and discrimination against minority
students.5 1

44. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 3-4 & n.6, Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679), available in
LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 6-8.
47. See id. at 3-4 & n.6; Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxnan, 832 F.
Supp. 836, 848 n.9 (1993).
48. See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 6-7, Taxman (No. 96-679).

49. 476 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1986).
50. 515 U.S. 200, 225-37 (1995).
51. See McGinley, Mock Opinions, infra pp. 248-50 (citing research used in
Justice Ginsberg's concurring opinion).
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III.

TITLE

VII
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AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided that it was illegal
under Title VII to take race into account when making an employment decision unless the purpose of the decision was to remedy the
present effects of past discrimination.5 2 Because the Board of Education's justification for its race-based decision was to create and
maintain a diverse faculty, and not to remedy discrimination, the

Board, according to the Court of Appeals, violated Title VII when it
selected Ms. Taxman over Ms. Williams for layoff.5 3 This conclusion rested on the nature of Title VII and on a narrow view of
Weber and Johnson, limiting the permissible use of race to the correction of a manifest imbalance in the workplace caused by

discrimination.
This holding invited the Respondent's argument before the
Supreme Court that Title VII imposes limitations on race-based

decisionmaking that exceed those imposed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 54 To support this position,
respondent made a curious argument contrasting Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.5 5 with Washington v. Davis.5 6 While it is true that

under the disparate impact theory Title VII protects minorities
and women in some instances better than the Equal Protection
Clause does, respondent distorts the purpose of Title VII, Griggs,
52. See Taxman v. Board of Educ. of the Township of Piscataway, 91 F.3d
1547, 1550-51 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
53. See id.
54. Up until recently, there was little question that the Equal Protection
Clause permitted some race-based practices for reasons other than the remedying
of past discrimination. That assumption was based in Justice Powell's opinion in
Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978) (stating that diversity in the student body of a higher educational institution was a
compelling state interest). However, in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941-44
(5th Cir. 1996) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Powell's opinion, because it was not joined by any other Justice, does not represent the Supreme
Court's view of the Equal Protection Clause and that only a remedial purpose will
be a compelling state interest under the Equal Protection Clause. According to
Hopwood, the policy must remedy past discrimination committed by the institution employing the affirmative action policy. See id. at 952. The Supreme Court
has yet to address this issue.
55. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See generally Brief for Respondent at 11, 19 n.30,
Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595
(1997) (No. 96-679), available in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679 (discussing the
Court's holdings in Griggs and Davis).
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and the affirmative action caselaw to conclude that this protection
extends to white "victims" of affirmative action plans.
IV.

GIGs v. DUKE POWER Co. AND WASHINGTON V. DAVIS

Griggs held that Duke Power was liable for using a high school
diploma and the results of standardized tests as hiring criteria for
jobs at the power plant because they produced a disparate impact
on Black applicants, and the employer could not show that the criteria were a business necessity. 57 In Davis, the Court declined to
extend the Griggs disparate impact analysis to a claim brought
under the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, it held that a violation of the Equal Protection Clause required a showing of discriminatory intent. 58 Here, the Respondent used this difference to argue generally that Title VII imposes greater limitations than the
Equal Protection Clause on an employer creating an affirmative
action plan. I find this argument troubling.
While it is true that Griggs imposes greater limitations on an
employer's actions than Davis, neither of these cases deals with
voluntary affirmative action plans. Moreover, the courts have traditionally applied the disparate impact analysis adopted in Griggs
to cases brought by women and minorities, not to "reverse discrimination" suits.5 9 Griggs permitted the use of disparate impact analysis, noting the historic inequality in the public segregated schools
in North Carolina and a substantially lower graduation rate for
Blacks than for Whites.6 0 Ironically, in Griggs, it seems, the Court
endorsed the disparate impact analysis precisely to remedy "societal discrimination," whereas the more recent affirmative action
cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause do not permit the
6
use of race-based preferences to remedy societal discrimination. '
57. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
58. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 236-39, 240-42.
59. My research has unearthed only one case applying disparate impact analysis to a policy having a negative impact on Whites. See Craig v. Alabama State
Univ., 804 F.2d 682, 685 (11th Cir. 1986) (applying disparate impact analysis to
policy disadvantaging Whites in a formerly all Black institution). Craig is unique
because it was brought against a "Black institution" and the power rested in the
hands of Blacks. Scholars have questioned whether disparate impact should ever
be used to challenge policies having an impact on Whites. See Michael J. Zimmer
et al., Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 415-16 (4th ed. 1997).
60. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 & n.6.
61. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986).
While it is true that Griggs is not a race-based decision, because disparate impact
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Although there is a serious question of whether the legislature
passing Title VII would have endorsed Griggs,6 2 the result is consistent with the legislative purpose of improving the economic condition of Blacks given the historical context in which Title VII was
passed. Moreover, subsequent amendments to Title VII, enacted
in 1991, have codified the Griggs ruling. 63 When doing so, Congress explicitly stated that it did not intend to affect legal volun64
tary affirmative action plans.
Disparate impact analysis demonstrates that Title VII may be
more protective of the interests of women and minorities while simultaneously generally forbidding discrimination against Whites.
Although this seems like a contradiction, there were at least two
statutory purposes behind Title VII, equal opportunity to all persons-a color blind purpose-and securing employment for
Blacks-a purpose best carried out through race-conscious
means. 65 In fact, Griggs led, at least in part, to the adoption of the
affirmative action plan that was challenged in Weber. With Griggs
and Executive Order 11246 directing the Secretary of Labor to require government contractors to assure adequate representation of
women and minorities through affirmative action, Kaiser faced potential liability and loss of business through government contracts.
As a result, Kaiser and the Steelworkers union devised the affirm66
ative action training plan that was later upheld in Weber.
As the application of disparate impact analysis only to female
and minority classes demonstrates, Title VII does permit differential treatment of members of certain defined protected classes. It
permits more beneficial treatment to minorities in the area of disparate impact analysis. It permits more beneficial treatment to
members of protected classes under the affirmative action cases as
well. This permission recognizes the historical context of the uneanalysis has been applied only to employment policies burdening minorities and
women, it is essentially a race-based theory. Thus, it cannot be distinguished from
race-conscious affirmative action measures.
62. For the best analysis I have seen of the legislative intent and purpose of
Title VII of the 1964 Act and an excellent explanation of how Griggs came about,
see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 13-80 (1994).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1994).
64. See 137 Cong. Rec. S7024 (daily ed. June 4, 1991) ("Nothing in the amendments ... shall be construed to affect... voluntary employer actions for work force
diversity, or affirmative action or conciliation agreements ... .
65. See Eskridge, supra note 62, at 28.
66. See id. at 24.
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qual treatment of women and Blacks in this country, a context that
the legislature responded to by enacting Title VII. Under Griggs,
there is a good argument that Title VII permits race-based decision-making pursuant to affirmative action plans that would be
unconstitutional if challenged under the Equal Protection Clause.
One of the justifications for relaxed scrutiny of affirmative action
plans has been the need to relieve the employer's dilemma between
defending a discrimination suit under Griggs and a reverse discrimination suit in response to a voluntarily adopted affirmative
67
action plan.
Moreover, Respondent's argument that Title VII permits more
limited affirmative action than the Equal Protection Clause is a
distortion of the Title VII affirmative action cases. In Johnson, the
leading affirmative action case under Title VII, the Court concluded that Title VII imposes fewer restrictions than the Equal
Protection Clause on an employer making affirmative action decisions: "The fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition
with which that employer must contend was not intended to ex68
tend as far as that of the Constitution."
This language demonstrates that the Court believed Title VII
permitted more leeway in creating affirmative action programs. 69
Although a few justices in Johnson opined that Title VII imposed
the same restrictions on a public employer as the Equal Protection
Clause,7 0 not one justice concluded that Title VII imposed more
limitations on voluntary affirmative action plans than did the
Equal Protection Clause.
67. See Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "QuotaBill," a
Codification of Griggs, a PartialReturn to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 287, 294-96 (1993).
68. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987).
69. Respondent argues that this passage is irrelevant dicta because there was
no challenge brought in Johnson under the Equal Protection Clause. See Brief for
Respondent at 28 n.30, Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v.
Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679) available in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs
679. Moreover the respondent argues that the Court was only referring to the fact
that "the remedial predicate for race-conscious action is somewhat less stringent
under Title VII than under the Constitution .... It is certainly not the case that
Title VII's requirements generally are less demanding than the Constitution's."
Id. These arguments are unconvincing.
70. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 664 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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JOINSOW AND WEBER: CONTINUED VITALITY

In Taxman, Respondent and amici never urged the Court to
overrule Weber and Johnson. Instead, they argued from the plain
language of Title VII and the original legislative history of the
1964 Act that Title VII was a color-blind statute. Thus, it did not
permit an employer to consider race when making an employment
decision unless the decision was made pursuant to an affirmative
action plan narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. These were exactly the same arguments, based on
the same statutory language and portions of legislative history,
that the Weber Court rejected in 1979.71
While it is true that a strict statutory constructionist looking
at the language of Title VII would likely conclude that it is always
impermissible to consider race when making an employment decision, these arguments have little force given subsequent Supreme
Court decisions and amendments of the Act. The Court in Weber
foreclosed the strict construction argument by examining the historical context of the statute-it was passed in large part to elimi72
nate discrimination against Blacks in the employment sector.
Weber noted that there is no language in the statute expressly forbidding the voluntary use of preferences to obviate discrimination.7 3 Instead, the language of the statute expressly states that
74
the statute does not require preferences based on race or gender.
Finally, Weber noted the emphasis in the legislative history on the
preservation of managerial prerogatives, concluding that the affirmative action plan in that case was permissible because it mirrored the purposes of the Act and did not unnecessarily trammel
75
the rights of non-minorities.

71. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,204-07 (1979).
However, the plaintiff in Weber argued that any and all justifications for affirmative action were illegal. See id. at 200-01.
72. For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Weber of the Congressional in-

tent of Title VII, see Eskridge, supra note 62, at 13-47.
73. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 203-04.
74. See id. at 204-07.
75. See id. at 206-09.
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VI.

COLOR BLINDNESS

76

UBER ALLES

Respondent's arguments embody a theoretical shift in discrimination law. This shift emphasizes the value of color-blindness
over all other values without concern for historical context and the
legislative purpose of improving the economic condition of Blacks.
Although a color-blind society is the goal we should eventually
achieve, Respondent's brand of color-blindness reinforces the historic barriers to economic success that members of minority races
have encountered. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, 7 7 there is a
significant difference between a powerful predominantly white
school board choosing to retain the only Black person in the Business Department in order to maintain diversity in the department
and the same society refusing to hire a Black business teacher because she is black. The first action, although not labeled as remedial, develops from an understanding of historical context. I would
not deem this action to be "discrimination" if it is narrowly tailored
to the desired goal. The second action, which reinforces the power
of white society, is the discrimination the statute was designed to
eliminate.
Respondent's simplistic color-blind approach was eschewed by
Weber and Johnson and subsequent legislative history of Title VII.
Weber and Johnson were never overruled legislatively. Although
this fact alone is not necessarily demonstrative of Congressional
approval, Title VII's history after Johnson gave Congress ample
opportunity to overrule the affirmative action cases. In the Summer of 1989, the Court handed down a number of conservative decisions, reinterpreting Title VII.7 8 One of these decisions, Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio79 seriously reduced the effectiveness of
Griggs, altering the standards and shifting the burden of proving
business necessity to the plaintiffs. Congress responded rapidly,
passing by a wide margin the Civil Rights Act of 1990 in order to
76. I call the theory that the purpose of color blindness trumps all other
purposes "Color Blindness Uber Alles," meaning "Color Blindness Above All."
77. See generally Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblindand
Race-ConsciousDecision Making Under Title VII, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003 (1997) (discussing the problems with the current judicial approach to Title VII cases and proposing a new conceptual framework for deciding such cases).
78. For a description of these decisions, see McGinley, supra note 29, at 203
n.1.
79. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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reinstate the protections of the Act. President Bush vetoed the
amendments and Congress responded with the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which President Bush signed under political pressure.8 0 The
1991 Act was meant to strengthen and improve civil rights law,
restoring rights lost by the Supreme Court decisions and adding
other rights. 8 ' In passing the Act, Congress did not emphasize the
color blind rationale of the statute. Instead, it focused on restoring
82
and improving the rights of women and minorities.
In fact, in passing the 1991 amendments, Congress stated explicitly that it did not intend to affect legal voluntary affirmative
action.8 3 Congress's explicit adoption and strengthening of disparate impact law in the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrates not only
approval of Griggs, but also a commitment to affirmative action
law as expressed in Johnson and Weber. 4 Moreover, Congress's
failure to overrule Johnson and Weber create a strong presumption
85
that the 1991 Act affirmatively incorporated Weber and Johnson.
VII.

REMEDIAL PURPOSE: INTERPRETATION

The Board of Education in Taxman never argued that it had a
remedial purpose in passing or implementing its affirmative action
plan. Its purpose was to achieve and maintain a diverse faculty.
This stipulation avoided a thorny issue present in most affirmative
action litigation. The Court has held that a voluntary plan whose
purpose is to remedy the present effects of past discrimination will
pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it is narrowly tailored to achieve its purpose. However, there appears to be considerable disagreement in the cases
concerning the definition of a "remedial" purpose.
80. For a description of the passage of the 1990 and 1991 Acts and the presidential veto, see McGinley, supra note 29, at 203-06.
81. See id.
82. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 161 (1998).
83. See supra note 62.
84. See Alfred W. Bhumrosen, Society in TransitionIV: Affirmation ofAffirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 903, 909-11
(1993).
85. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998) (stating that
the force of Supreme Court precedent in the area of sexual harassment was enhanced because Congress amended Title VII's liability provisions in 1991 without
amending the Supreme Court decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986)).

226 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:209
The disagreement focuses on three issues: the identity of the
"victims" who are permitted to benefit from the legislation, the
identity of the perpetrators who may remedy the past discrimination and the fit between the two. While the Court has clearly
stated that under the Equal Protection Clause, it is not a permissible purpose to remedy "societal discrimination,"8 6 because it is too
"amorphous,"8 7 the question remains exactly what is a permissible
remedy and who can benefit from it.88 Although the earlier cases
seemed to permit a more widespread definition of remedial purpose,8 9 recent cases have moved the inquiry to levels of specificity
that may be impossible to prove.
For example, in Hopwood v. Texas,90 although the state of
Texas's educational system had subjected Black and Mexican students to widespread race discrimination and segregation, 9 1 a panel
of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently ignored this discrimination, requiring evidence that the law school itself had discriminated in the past.9 2 In Podberesky v. Kirwan,9 3 the Fourth Circuit
struck down minority scholarships at the University of Maryland,
in part because there was no proof that the persons to be awarded
scholarships belong to the class discriminated against. Assuming
that the University had discriminated in the past, the Court
stated, "[high achievers, whether African-American or not, are not
the group against which the University discriminated in the
94
past."
Some have advocated limiting the use of "remedial" measures
to exclude Blacks who have recently immigrated to this country
because their ancestors were not slaves and their descendants
86. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986).
87. Id. at 276.
88. Although the Petitioner did not argue that Title VII gave government
more leeway than the Equal Protection Clause to adopt affirmative action plans,
there is a good argument that it does. See supra, Part IV (discussing Johnson and
Weber).
89. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 631-34 (1987)
(stating that the Agency's purpose of "remedying underrepresentation" is

sufficient).
90.

861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), reuv'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).

91. See id. at 554, 556-57.
92.
93.

See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 952.
38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).

94. Id. at 158.
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should not share in the benefits of affirmative action.95 Others
have argued that affirmative action should not burden them because "my family never owned slaves." 96 These arguments are
rooted in two beliefs: first, a remedy can be granted only to a person who was harmed or to his or her descendants; second, the person displaced by the remedy or his or her ancestors must be
culpable of an evil act. 97 These arguments narrowly define the remedial purpose of affirmative action and demonstrate the poverty
of the remedial justification for affirmative action. The justification should be broadened to take into account the historical treatment of women and minorities and the overwhelming presence of
intentional and unintentional discrimination rooted in unconscious
stereotyping that non-whites and non-males experience daily.98
VIII.

OTHER PURPOSES

The most important question raised by Taxman is whether
non-remedial reasons will justify the use of race-conscious measures. Although every legitimate purpose for affirmative action is
grounded in history, affirmative action should also play a forwardlooking role. In my view, the purpose of affirmative action is
neither to remedy past discrimination nor to achieve or maintain
diversity for its own sake in our workplaces and our schools. The
overriding purpose is to create the free, equal society to which we
Americans give lip service.
While it is true that diversity in the classroom provides an opportunity for a robust exchange of ideas, I agree with Professor
Charles Lawrence that the First Amendment justification for di95. See Amicus Brief Curiae of Yvette Farmer and Pacific Legal Foundation in
Support of Respondent Sharon Taxman at 7, Board of Education of the Township
of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679), available in LEXIS,
1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
96. This argument was made by Commissioner Langley of the 1997-98 Florida
Constitution Revision Commission when debating the merits of an affirmative action proposal. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40 pt. 2, at 160-64 (1998).
97. This is a curious position given that when there is a finding of discrimination, courts can order remedies displacing persons who themselves are not responsible for the discrimination itself. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 372-75 (1977).
98. See generally McGinley, supra note 77 (proposing a new conceptual framework for Title VII cases that considers a broad range of issues).
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versity is insufficient. 99 Instead, as Professor Lawrence explains,
diversity's purpose should be the destruction and subordination of
racism and "disestablishing white supremacist structures and
ideologies." 10 0
Our society is already diverse. The real question is whether

we intend to perpetuate a society built on slavery and maintained
by white privilege. This is the society that the color-blind uber alles principle would reinforce. Unless education and positions of

power are open to persons of color and women, the voices of persons who have had different experiences by virtue of their gender

or color will be lost.

0°1

Without these voices, our society will not

attain the promise of equality and freedom for all that we say we

hold dearly.
In Taxman, amicus briefs for the National Education Association
and the American Council on Education 10 3 present social
science research unquestionably demonstrating that a diverse
classroom promises a better education for Blacks and Whites and a
10 2

more unified society. A diverse faculty helps to protect children of
color from stereotyping by White faculty members and promotes
the educational achievement of Black students. These findings
should be sufficient to confirm that diversity is and should be a
compelling governmental interest. Like school desegregation at
0 4
affirmative action repthe time of Brown v. Board of Education,'
resents more than a mere remedial purpose. It seeks to change
society and the opportunities for all persons living on American

soil.
99. See Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper
Meaning, in Symposium, In Honor of Professor Trina Grillo: Legal Educationfor a
Diverse World, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 757, 774-76 (1997).
100. Id. at 775.
101. Professor Lawrence explains that this is not the stereotypical assumption
that all women or all persons of color will have the same viewpoint. Instead, persons who have been subject to discrimination bring important experiences to the
university as well as a commitment to ending racism and sexism. See id. at 77577.
102. See Amicus Brief for the National Education Association at 5-11, Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No. 96-679),
available in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
103. See Amicus Brief for the American Council on Education et al. at 3-7,
Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595
(1997) (No. 96-679), available in LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679.
104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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STRATEGIES, WEAKNESSES AND INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

Although I have commented implicitly on the lawyers' strategies in this case, I would like to discuss briefly the weaknesses of
the Petitioner's and Respondent's cases, respectively. Although
the Respondent's strategy was to deal a mortal blow to affirmative
action, I think that there were better arguments on narrower
grounds to defeat the School Board. Placing myself in the shoes of
a moderate/conservative Justice O'Connor, I was quite concerned
that the School Board had not considered the purpose for its affirmative action policy. The School Board would have made a
much stronger case had it considered all of the literature on the
importance of diversity in the educational context before adopting
the plan and before making a decision based on the plan. Members
of the Board of Education, although acting in good faith, may not
have had a factual basis for their decision, even though there was
plenty of literature supporting their general views. My mock opinion of Justice O'Connor found the Board of Education's lack of information troubling, whereas the mock concurrence of Justice
Ginsberg relied more heavily on the social science research
l0 5
presented in amicus briefs.
Even assuming the legitimacy of the plan because of the social
science research, there was a question of whether it was properly
applied here to the Business Department. Is diversity in every department a compelling state interest? Was there a proper "fit" be105. Another issue was whether the Court should balance the state interest
against the method used to achieve it. The amicus brief for the Mexican American
Legal Defense Fund argued that the Court should balance the two. Since the

method was so innocuous-the selection of an equally qualified person for retention-when compared to the ordinary procedure-a lottery-MALDEF argued
that the Court should accept diversity as a sufficient interest, even if in other circumstances it may not be sufficiently compelling to justify a race-based preference.
See Amicus Brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Piscataway Township Board of Education v. Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997) (No.
96-679), availablein LEXIS, 1996 U.S. Briefs 679. This argument had'a great deal
of appeal because, practically speaking, the race-based decision here was hardly

what people usually think of as "affirmative action." No preference was granted to
a less qualified person of color. And, the chance that Taxman would not have been
laid off using the normal lottery procedure was only 50%. Thus, Taxman was not

superior to Williams and she had no legitimate expectation that she would win the
lottery. Because, however, no Justice has ever spoken of a balancing test to assure
the legitimacy of an affirmative action policy, I chose not to adopt this method in
the mock opinions.
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tween the plan here and the decision made? The answer to these
questions may rely on facts that were not in the record.
The petitioner adopted a strategy which avoided arguing that
the standards for permissible affirmative action plans are less
strict under Title VII than the Equal Protection Clause. I assume
that the reason for the strategy was twofold. First, since the composition of the Supreme Court had changed since Johnson, there
may not be a majority on the Supreme Court that would adopt this
reasoning. Second, this ruling would not be beneficial to public
employers overall since most race-based decision-making will be
challenged under both the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII. I
think this strategy altogether makes sense, but as I demonstrate
above, I think there is still a very good argument based on Griggs,
Weber and Johnson, that Title VII imposes fewer limitations on the
employer's voluntary use of race-conscious measures and I would
encourage lawyers to develop this argument. Even if it is not successful before this Supreme Court in the case of a public employer,
this point may be particularly important to private employers in
the future.
The School Board's lack of information about diversity raised
the question of institutional competence. Do legislatures, the
courts, or the institutions themselves have the competence to determine whether a remedial purpose is legitimate or necessary? If
it is necessary to prove that discrimination has occurred in the institution before adopting an affirmative action remedy, who should
determine whether discrimination has occurred: Congress, a local
or state legislature, an institution voluntarily adopting a program,
or a court?
Courts are generally more capable of deciding whether past
discrimination has occurred in a particular institution. Legislatures generally are more attuned to fact-finding in order to create
future-oriented policy and law. Should not the Board of Education
be given broad discretion in adopting and implementing its plan?
Should good faith be the test of the permissibility of the Board's
decision? Is a Board of Education capable of investigating the
facts?
Because Justice O'Connor seemed to ignore these institutional
competence arguments in Adarand, I did not discuss them in her
mock opinion. However, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Adarand
may have a number of possible effects. Because they know that
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affirmative action policies will be subject to strict scrutiny, individual institutions will forego formulating and implementing affirmative action plans. Even if the institutions do implement affirmative action plans, courts may interpret strict scrutiny to be an
almost automatic finding that race-based provisions are
unconstitutional.
Finally, strict scrutiny may shift the responsibility of analyzing whether a particular affirmative action plan passes constitutional muster from Congress, legislatures and School Boards to the
courts. Although it is usually within the courts' role to decide
whether particular legislation is constitutional, the courts tend to
be backward-looking, generally lacking the ability to determine
policy. Will the courts struggle with locating the permissible line
separating constitutional race-based decision-making and that
which is unconstitutional? Certainly, it appears lower courts will
play an important role in this fact-finding. It is also certain that
the fact-finding should include testimony of experts concerning the
purpose for making a race-based decision in the particular context.
The question remains whether the lower courts will take this factfinding seriously, rather than automatically striking down all racebased decision-making.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWNSHIP
OF PISCATAWAY,
PETITIONER,
V.

SHARON TAXMAN,
RESPONDENT.

O'CONNOR, J., announced the Court's judgment and filed an
opinion expressing her views of the case. GINSBERG, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment in which STEVENS, SOUTER
AND BREYER, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in which GINSBERG, J., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed an opinion dissenting in which KENNEDY, J.,
joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion dissenting in which THOMAS,
J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a separate dissenting opinion.
JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court.
This case presents the question of whether under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. a public school district having no history of prior discrimination or underrepresentation of Blacks in its professional staff can take race into account
when selecting between two equal candidates for layoff, one Black
and one White. The Court of Appeals decided this case on the basis
of a thin factual record, reaching a broad conclusion that it is never
permissible under Title VII, as interpreted in United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), to consider race in making a
layoff decision unless there is a history of race discrimination and a
remedial purpose for the discrimination. Taxman v. Board of Educ.
of the Township of Piscataway,91 F.3d 1547, 1557 (3d Cir. 1996).
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the layoff failed the
second prong of the Weber test because it unnecessarily trammeled
the rights of non-minorities. Id. at 1565. Because we believe that
under some circumstances that may be present in this case, diversity in the teaching staff of a school district could present a compelling interest and a race-based decision could be narrowly tailored
to achieve this interest, we must reverse and remand to develop a
233
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factual record that would permit us to decide the legality under
Title VII of the Board of Education's action in this case.
I.1
In May, 1989, the Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway, New Jersey, reacting to a decline in student enrollment
in business courses, decided to reduce by one the number of business education teachers in the Business Department at Piscataway
High School. According to New Jersey law, layoffs were governed
by seniority, the last hired to be laid off first; ties were broken by
the Board of Education as it saw fit. In 1983, the Board had
adopted a formal affirmative action policy 2 which stated in its
entirety:
PISCATAWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF EDUCATION
Piscataway, NJ
Policy 4111.1
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION-EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
PURPOSE:
This policy ensures equal employment opportunity and prohibits discrimination in employment because of sex, race,
color, creed, religion, handicap, domicile, marital status or
national origin. In all cases, the most qualified candidate will
be recommended for appointment. However, when candidates
appear to be of equal qualification, candidates meeting the
criteria of the Affirmative Action Program will be
recommended.
BASIC POLICY:
The Superintendent of Schools shall implement a program of
equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. This
program shall be an integral part of every aspect of employment including upgrading positions, demotions, transfers, re1. Unless otherwise noted, the facts presented in this section are undisputed
and come from the opinion of the Court of Appeals decision, 91 F.3d at 1550-52.
2. In 1975, the Board of Education adopted an affirmative action policy for
employment decisions in response to a regulation promulgated by the New Jersey
State Board of Education, directing local school boards to adopt affirmative action
programs. In 1983, the Board adopted the one page policy cited in the text of the
opinion. See 91 F.3d at 1550.
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cruitment, recruitment advertising, layoffs, benefits, selection
for training, promotions and tenure.
Joint Appendix at 269.
At the time the layoff was to occur, there were ten teachers in
the business department. Of the ten teachers, only one, Debra Williams, was a minority. Ms. Williams had been hired in 1980, the
first Black hired to teach in the business department at Piscataway High School and the only Black in the department in 1989.
On the same day Williams was hired, the Respondent was also
hired to teach in the business department. Ms. Williams and Ms.
Taxman were tied in seniority and were the two business teachers
with the least amount of seniority. As the Board met to decide
which teacher to lay off, it also found Taxman and Williams to be
equal in qualifications.
For prior layoffs, the Board had decided ties by flipping a coin,
but never before had the Board dealt with a situation where a
White and a Black teacher were tied. After deliberation, the Board
reached a consensus to invoke the affirmative action policy to
break the tie because it believed that a better educational experience resulted for students by fostering diversity and cultural tolerance. Sharon Taxman, the White teacher, was laid off while Debra
Williams, the Black teacher, was retained. This was the first time
in the history of the affirmative action policy that the Board had
taken race into account in making a personnel decision. See Joint
Appendix at 194.
At the time the Board decided to lay off Sharon Taxman, the
Board was unaware of any previous discrimination against Blacks
in the school district. Moreover, Blacks were not underrepresented
in the professional staff in the district as a whole when compared
to their availability in the relevant labor market.
Sharon Taxman filed a race discrimination charge with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") alleging violations of Title VII and the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"). The United States government
filed suit on behalf of Ms. Taxman and Ms. Taxman intervened.
After discovery, the Board moved for summary judgment and
the United States and Taxman cross-moved for partial summary
judgment on liability only. The district court denied the Board's
motion and granted partial summary judgment to the United
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States and Taxman. The court held that the decision violated both
Title VII and the NJLAD.
After a trial on the damages, Ms. Taxman, who had since been
rehired by the Board, was awarded damages under Title VII and
the NJLAD. The Board of Education appealed to the Third Circuit.
The United States sought leave to appear in support of reversal,
stating that it could no longer support the district court decision.
The Court of Appeals treated the United States' motion as a motion to withdraw as a party, which it granted, leaving Taxman and
the Board of Education as the only parties before the court. Before
issuing a decision, the Third Circuit heard argument three times
on the matter, twice before a panel and once en banc. It finally
issued a decision en banc on August 8, 1996 which affirmed the
lower court judgment by a vote of 8-4. 91 F.3d 1547.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Piscataway
School Board violated Title VII when it laid off Sharon Taxman,
Respondent, and kept Debra Williams, because the purpose behind
the race-based decision was not remedial and the method used unnecessarily trammeled on the expectations of the white teacher,
Sharon Taxman. 91 F.3d at 1550.
The Court of Appeals reached this decision by concluding that
Title VII permits taking race into account only to remedy past discrimination. Id.
II.
This case, like most other disparate treatment cases brought
under Title VII, applies the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973), method of proof. Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-627 (1987). Under this method, the
plaintiff retains the burden of proving intentional illegal discrimination throughout. Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
the employment decision. We have held that a bona fide affirmative action policy is such a reason. Id. Once the defendant claims
that the affirmative action policy is a bona fide reason for taking
race or gender into account, the burden of production shifts back to
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's reliance on the policy is
pretextual. The ultimate burden of proof remains throughout on
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the plaintiff as in any other Title VII case applying the McDonnell
Douglas construct. Id.

3

In this case, the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case by demonstrating that the Board of Education took race into account
when determining whom to lay off from the Piscataway High
School Business Department. This proof shifted the burden to the
Board of Education to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for Taxman's layoff. In keeping with Johnson, the Board of
Education here produced evidence that it selected Ms. Taxman for
layoff after consulting its affirmative action plan. 4 This done, the
burden is on Ms. Taxman to prove that the plan is not a bona fide
5
affirmative action plan.
Here, Ms. Taxman and the United States, the plaintiffs in the
case, moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
3. This is not very different from affirmative action plans challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause. As I explained in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 292-93 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment):
[Tihe nonminority teachers could easily demonstrate that the purpose and
effect of the plan is to impose a race-based classification. But when the
Board introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose,
thereby supplying the court with the means for determining that the
Board had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority teachers to prove their case;
they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the
Board's evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and
thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this
evidence was not sufficiently "narrowly tailored." Only by meeting this
burden could the plaintiffs establish a violation of their constitutional
rights, and thereby defeat the presumption that the Board's assertedly
remedial action based on the statistical evidence was justified.
4. There appears to be some factual dispute as to whether the Board of Education was acting pursuant to its own affirmative action plan. See Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 17, (claiming that the decision was not pursuant to an
affirmative action plan). The President of the Board of Education, at the time the
decision was made, certified, "[o]ur decision to retain Ms. Williams was a voluntary
one on our part, for the reasons stated. Our affirmative action policy on its face
required, at most, that a minority be 'recommended'. I did not feel bound to follow
that recommendation, except as my conscience and good judgment dictated." Joint
Appendix at 194.
5. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits suggests that the Board's reasons
for the decision were not adequately explored by the trial court. See Reply Brief at
17. This claim raises the question of whether the burden of proof would rest on
Taxman to prove that the plan is not bona fide or whether the Board of Education
would have the burden of interposing an affirmative defense in this case. This
issue, however, has not been briefed by the parties or decided by the courts below.
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According to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment will be granted only if there are no genuine issues
of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. The moving party in this case bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is entitled to summary judgment. Where the moving party on a motion for summary judgment
is also the party with the burden of persuasion, the party has a
very heavy burden to overcome.
Upon the Respondent's motions for partial summary judgment, the district court concluded that a non-remedial purpose can
never justify a race-based employment decision under Title VII.
832 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D.N.J. 1993). In the alternative, the court
concluded that in any event, the Board of Education's plan was not
narrowly tailored to achieve its stated purpose of achieving diversity in the faculty population. 832 F. Supp. at 848. Because the
district court viewed the question on partial summary judgment as
a narrow legal question, it did not permit the development of the
factual record, testing whether there was a compelling governmental interest for diversity in the faculty at the business school, 832
F. Supp. at 848 n. 9, a development that I believe is necessary to
the determination of whether the Board of Education acted legally.
Unless we are ready to decide that a diverse faculty is never a
justification for a school board to take race into account in making
a layoff decision, we need a more developed factual record to decide
whether the school board's justification for its decision is legal.
This is particularly true now that the Respondent is justifying the
summary judgment decision with reasons that were not before the
lower courts and of which the petitioner had no notice at the time
of the lower courts' consideration of the matter. Therefore, the district court erred in granting the motion and the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the district court's judgment. Thus, we will reverse and remand this case for application of the standards developed by this Court. 6
6. This case differs, in my view, from Wygant in a key respect. In Wygant,
although the district court failed to make factual findings necessary to uphold the
collective bargaining agreement as remedial, my opinion invalidating the agreement in Wygant did not rest on that fact. For that reason, I did not vote to remand.
Instead, in Wygant, the claimed constitutional rationale for the race-based decision
was remedial. The petitioners in Wygant met their burden of proving that the
affirmative action plan was illegitimate by demonstrating that the affirmative action provision was keyed to an illegitimate hiring goal. That hiring goal was linked
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This Court has twice considered the validity of interposing affirmative action plans for making race- and gender-based decisions
under Title VII. In both United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979) and Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987)
there was a history of discrimination or underrepresentation
either in the workplace itself or in a craft union that trained workers for the position. We concluded in Weber and Johnson that
although the plain language of Title VII did not appear to contemplate the "benign" use of race- or gender-based decision-making,
the particular affirmative action policies in those cases furthered
the purposes of Title VII by permitting managerial discretion in
creating voluntary programs to correct the imbalances in the workplace. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-209; Johnson, 480 U.S. at 640-642.
Although in Weber and Johnson there was a manifest imbalance in the work forces based on race or gender, Weber made clear
that it did not set out the only instances where it would be appropriate under Title VII to take race and gender into account, Weber,
443 U.S. at 208, and we did not reach the question in either of
those cases of whether acquiring and maintaining a diverse faculty
to the percentage of minorities in the student population, rather than to the percentage of qualified minority teachers in the relevant labor pool. Because the disparity between percentage of minority students and the percentage of minority
faculty is not probative of employment discrimination, see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977), I concluded in Wygant that the affirmative
action plan which was designed as a remedial provision, could not be upheld. I
stated, "[blecause the layoff provision here acts to maintain levels of minority hiring that have no relation to remedying employment discrimination, it cannot be
adjudged 'narrowly tailored' to effectuate its asserted remedial purpose." 476 U.S.
at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Here, the Piscataway Board of Education makes no claim that its justification
for its affirmative action plan is remedial. Instead, it offers diversity of faculty as a
justification, a justification we have not yet addressed. In Wygant, I stated,
The goal of providing "role models" discussed by the courts below should
not be confused with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity
among the faculty. Because this latter goal was not urged as such in support of the layoff provision before the district Court and the Court of Appeals, however, I do not believe it necessary to discuss the magnitude of
that interest or its applicability in this case. The only governmental interests at issue here are those of remedying "societal" discrimination, providing "role models," and remedying apparent prior employment
discrimination by the School Board.
Id. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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in an educational institution without a history of discrimination
would support a voluntary affirmative action plan under Title VII.
Besides Weber and Johnson, which dealt with the standards
for voluntary affirmative action programs under Title VII, this
Court has also considered the validity of affirmative action plans
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. As I have made clear in Johnson, I believe that the requirements of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause are the same for public institutions. 480 U.S. at 649
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Thus, even though the
plaintiffs in this case made no challenge to the decision of the
Board of Education under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we must look to our equal protection jurispru7
dence as well as our Title VII jurisprudence to decide this case.
IV.

Our cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause make
clear that when determining the legality of all race-based decisions, no matter who benefits from the classification, no matter
which governmental body makes the classification, the Court must
apply strict scrutiny. Adarand Constuctors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995). To survive strict scrutiny, a race-based decision
must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental
interest. Id.
The application of strict scrutiny, however, does not automatically invalidate a race-based classification. Instead, it requires the
court examining the classification to make a searching inquiry into
the justification for the measure. As I stated in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989):
7. Respondent argues that Title VII imposes even greater limitations on
race-based affirmative action measures than the Equal Protection Clause. I cannot accept this proposition. Not one of the members of the Court in deciding Johnson even suggested that Title VII would prohibit voluntary race-based measures
permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the disagreement in Johnson arose between two groups of justices, one arguing that Title VII permitted voluntary measures that would not pass muster under the Constitution, see 480 U.S.
at 626-31 & nn. 6-8, and the other arguing that the standard for public employers
was the same under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, see 480 U.S. at 649
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 480 U.S. at 664 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To
conclude that Title VII imposes greater restrictions on employers would contravene the purposes of the Act and nullify the Congressional intent to preserve managerial prerogatives.
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Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Indeed, the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The
test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling
goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the
motive for the classification was illegitimate racial prejudice
or stereotype.
Id. at 493 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.).
The Adarand Court stated, "[t]he unhappy persistence of both
the practice and the lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is an unfortunate reality,
and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it."
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237.
Thus, application of strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory, but
fatal in fact," id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519
(1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)) and we must examine the purpose of the race classification here as well as the
means of achieving the goal.
This searching inquiry can only occur where there exists a full
factual record explaining the history of the race-based decision and
the motivations of the decisionmakers at the time of making the
decision.
V.
In this case, the Piscataway Board of Education claims that its
compelling state interest is a diverse faculty. Diversity of faculty,
according to the Board, leads to an improved educational experience for students and faculty. The policy applied here, according to
the Board of Education, was narrowly tailored to achieve this purpose because it applied only after the Board had determined that
the employees were equal in seniority and qualifications. In fact,
the Board argues, it had never applied the policy before to an individual employment decision. 8
8.

See Joint Appendix at 194.
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It is an open question whether diversity can ever be a compelling state interest justifying a race-based decision. In Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), the Court struck
down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause a medical school
special admissions program that reserved 16 of 100 seats for minorities, insulating them from competition with candidates applying through the general admissions program. Id. at 320. Justice
Powell, in dicta, concluded that diversity of a student body in an
institution of higher learning was a compelling state interest, but
the particular program at issue at the University of Davis was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve this purpose. Justice Powell's conclusion that diversity was a proper justification for racebased affirmative action programs in higher education was based
on First Amendment considerations of academic freedom. Justice
Powell stated:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a
diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education. Academic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
Id. at 311-312.
Quoting Justice Frankfurter, Justice Powell continued:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere
which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.
Id. (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)).
Finally, Justice Powell recommended the use of the "Harvard
Plan" to achieve diversity. This method, used by Harvard University in its admissions program, permitted the consideration of race
as a plus factor among many other factors. Four other Justices
agreed that a plan like the "Harvard Plan" would be constitutional
if used in a public institution "at least so long as the use of race to
achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering
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effects of past discrimination." 438 U.S. at 326 n. 1 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
In Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications
Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), employing an intermediate level of
scrutiny, this Court upheld the FCC's minority ownership policies,
which gave minority applications for new licenses and enhancement and permitted a limited category of existing radio and television broadcast stations to be transferred in a "distress sale" only to
minority-controlled firms. 497 U.S. at 552. After the policies were
in effect, Congress enacted into law the FCC appropriations legislation for fiscal year 1988, which prohibited the Commission from
spending any appropriated funds to examine or change the minority policies, thereby placing its approval on the race-based classification. Id. at 560.
Metro Broadcasting applied an intermediate level of scrutiny
because its use of race was considered a "benign" classification. In
that case, there was no remedial purpose. Instead, the Court concluded that the policies were substantially related to achieving the
important governmental interests of achieving diversity in broadcasting. Id. at 564-565. Metro Broadcastinghad a short life, however. In Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v. Pena, this Court made clear
that strict scrutiny must be applied to all race-based classifications
whether they be "benign" or invidious. Expressly overruling Metro
Broadcastingthe Court stated:
Accordingly, we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor,
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.
In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if
they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling
governmental interests. To the extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is overruled.
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
Justice Stevens' dissent in Adarand read these words to overrule Metro Broadcastingonly to the extent that it applied the improper standard under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 257-258
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that Adarand was not inconsistent with the conclusion in Metro Broadcasting that fostering
diversity "may provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program." Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I agree with this reading
of Adarand, but I also believe that Metro Broadcastingis not deter-
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minative of the case before us. The regulation in Metro Broadcasting was analyzed under the intermediate scrutiny test and the
Court has not addressed whether such a regulation would be upheld if subject to strict scrutiny. Because in Adarand we did not
apply the strict scrutiny standard to the classification in Metro
Broadcasting,we have never reached the question of whether the
FCC rules would survive strict scrutiny. Furthermore, even if the
FCC rules would be upheld under the strict scrutiny standard,
there appear to be sufficient factual differences from this case that
without the development of a factual record, we cannot say
whether faculty diversity in the business department of a public
high school is a sufficiently compelling reason for the race-based
decision in the present case.
Respondent would have us conclude, without the benefit of the
factual record, that diversity is never a sufficiently compelling interest to withstand strict scrutiny. I cannot agree with this
conclusion.
In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), the
Court struck down as unconstitutional an affirmative action plan
negotiated by the union and the employer that laid off more senior
White employees before less senior Black teachers were laid off.
This Court rejected the Board of Education's arguments that the
plan was justified because Black teachers provided role models for
Black students and the plan remedied societal discrimination. 476
U.S. at 288-289 (O'Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). As I noted in my concurrence, however, Wygant did not
present the very different question of whether a diverse faculty in
an educational setting can justify a race-based affirmative action
program. Id.
Here, as in Wygant, there is no evidence of a history of discrimination. Instead, the Board of Education would have us approve
the use of race as a tie-breaker in order to assure that students and
faculty in the business department of a high school have access to a
diverse faculty. Under certain conditions, I believe that the goal of
acquiring and maintaining a diverse faculty could be compelling.
I need not, however, go as far as the concurring opinions in
this case. I merely believe that a diverse faculty in the business
department may be a compelling justification for considering race
along with other factors in a layoff decision. I cannot reach this
conclusion, however, without a more developed record.
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In developing the record, the parties should concentrate on the
reasons why a diverse faculty is compelling, including, but not limited to, the numbers of Black faculty members in the Piscataway
High School, the frequency of exposure of the business students to
Black faculty members in other courses, and data demonstrating
that a diverse faculty protects students from discriminatory treatment.9 Expert evidence demonstrating why a diverse faculty enhances the educational experience of students from different
backgrounds, as well as more specific evidence demonstrating why
it is important to maintain diversity in the Business Department,
would help inform the Court's judgment concerning the importance
of diversity in this context.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
It is so ordered
JUSTICE GINSBERG, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS, JUSTICE SOUTER and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring in the
judgment.
The narrow question before the Court is whether the decision
made by the Board of Education of the Township of Piscataway to
lay off a White teacher instead of an equally-qualified Black
teacher is valid under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 10 We would hold that the
decision was legal under Title VII and therefore reverse the holding of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Because, however, Justice O'Connor, whose vote constitutes the necessary vote to make a
majority of this Court, prefers a more developed factual record, we
agree that the case should be remanded to the lower courts for development of the facts on the record.
I.
According to the undisputed facts in this case, the Piscataway
Board of Education had to choose to lay off one of two equally qual9. See Reply Brief at 6-8 (stating that petitioner intended to present evidence
demonstrating that a more diverse faculty protected students from discriminatory
treatment).
10. This suit was not brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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ified faculty members in the Business Department of Piscataway
High School. One, Debra Williams, was the only minority in the
business department and the first Black hired to teach in the department. The other, Sharon Taxman, a White woman, was hired
to teach on the same day as Ms. Williams. After considering the
seniority and qualifications of both women, the Board of Education
reached the conclusion that they were equal in seniority and in
qualifications.
In other instances where there was a need to lay off a faculty
member and the Board found a tie, the Board used a lottery system
to break the tie. Never before, however, had the Board decided between two equal candidates: one Black and one White. The Board
met at least twice thoroughly to discuss its decision, concluding finally to lay off Ms. Taxman, the White teacher and retain Ms. Williams, the Black teacher. At the time of the layoff, the School
District had an affirmative action policy in force which is quoted in
its entirety in JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S opinion.
Although Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits raises a dispute as to whether this policy applied to layoffs and as to whether
the Board invoked the affirmative action plan to reach its decision, 1 on its face, the policy applies to layoffs and there is undisputed testimony in the record that, at least, the Board was aware
of the plan when it made its decision, that it did not consider the
plan to require the layoff of the White faculty member instead of
the Black one, and that the board had discretion in deciding
whether to use race to break the tie. See Joint Appendix at 194.
At the time the decision was made, there was only one minority faculty member-Ms. Williams-teaching in the business department. In the Piscataway High School as a whole, there were
176 professional staff members, 14 of whom were Black. See Brief
for Petitioner at 2. Blacks were not underrepresented in the professional jobs with reference to the qualified labor pool. Id. at 2 n.
3. Moreover, at the time the Board made its decision it was unaware of any previous discriminatory actions made in personnel decisions at the school district. Id. at 2.
At his deposition, Mr. Theodore H. Kruse, the President of the
Piscataway Board of Education in 1989 when the decision was
made to abolish the secretarial studies job and to retain Ms. Wil11. See Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits at 17.
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liams, testified that he had voted in favor of adopting the abovequoted affirmative action policy in 1983 for the following reason:
Basically, I think because I had been aware that the student
body and the community which is our responsibility, the
schools of the community, is really quite diverse and there-I
have a general feeling during my tenure on the board that it
was valuable for the students to see in the various employment roles a wide range of background, and that it was also
valuable to the work force and in particular to the teaching
staff that they have-they see that in each other.
Joint Appendix at 196.
When asked in what way retaining Ms. Williams furthered an
educational objective for the Piscataway Board of Education, Mr.
Kruse testified:
In my own personal perspective I believe by retaining Mrs.
Williams it was sending a very clear message that we feel
that our staff should be culturally diverse, our student population is culturally diverse and there is a distinct advantage
to students, to all students, to be made-come into contact
with people of different cultures, different background, so
that they are more aware, more tolerant, more accepting,
more understanding of people of all background.
Id. at 197.
When asked to define "culturally diverse," Kruse further
testified:
Someone other than-different than yourself. And we have,
our student population and our community has people of all
different background, ethnic background, religious background, cultural background, and it's important that our
school district encourage awareness and acceptance and tolerance and, therefore, I personally think it's important that
our staff reflect that, too.
Id.
In a certification submitted to the district court after his deposition on July 1, 1993 to clarify the above comments made in his
deposition, Mr. Kruse certified:
Based on my experience as a university professor and a
long-time Piscataway Township Board of Education member,
I had come to the conclusion by May 1989 that a racially and
culturally diverse faculty and student body promoted a more
enriching educational environment for students. During my
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tenure on the Board beginning in approximately 1983, we
have taken various steps in the School District in furtherance
of that goal. As an educator and school board member, I see
this objective as distinct from fostering equitable labor relations; the former is for the students' benefit, the latter for the
employees'.
When we were confronted with this issue in May 1989, it
was the first time I can recall that the Board itself was ever
given a choice of considering race as a factor, to any extent, in
making a specific personnel decision. In the past, we normally
deferred to the recommendation of our Superintendent on
personnel matters, without extensive discussion. Because of
the unusual nature of this case, we discussed it in depth as a
Board, . . . recognizing the unique circumstances confronting

us. Our decision to retain Ms. Williams was a voluntary one
on our part, for the reasons stated. Our affirmative action policy on its face required, at most, that a minority be "recom-

mended." I did not feel bound to follow that recommendation,
except as my conscience and good judgment dictated.
Joint Appendix at 194.12

Although these expressions of the Board of Education's beliefs
about the importance of diversity to the education of the Piscataway students are somewhat general, the research on educational
institutions strongly supports the Board's conclusion that a better
educational experience for faculty and students will occur in a diverse educational setting. See Brief of Amici Curiae American
Council on Education et al., at 7-13. Moreover, there exists a
"strong consensus among educators, representing a broad spectrum of institutions, that diversity is essential to the institutions'
missions." Id. at 3. See, e.g., American Council on Education, Making the Case for Affirmative Action in Higher Education 19-23
(1996) (reporting comments of university presidents supporting affirmative action); Neil L. Rudenstine, Why a Diverse Student Body
is so Important, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Apr. 19, 1996, at B1
(president of Harvard University sees diversity as a means of overcoming society's stratification). Both social-science data and the
anecdotal evidence of educators working in the field "support the
12. It is unclear whether the district court considered this statement in its
decision, but it made clear that the statement, "even if factually supported, does
not constitute a legal justification for the Board's Affirmative Action plan.
832
F. Supp. at 848 n. 9.
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conclusion that diversity improves education and advances the
goals of imparting knowledge where there was preconception, and
fostering mutual regard where there was hostile stereotype." Amicus Brief of American Council on Education at 9.
Specifically, there are measurable positive effects of a diverse
student body and faculty on the education of both Black and White
students. Students learning in an environment that is more diverse and who have the opportunity to discuss issues of race and
culture in school tend to be more successful in college. See, e.g.,
Alexander W. Astin, Diversity and Multiculturalism on the Campus: How are Students Affected? 25 Change 44, 46, 48 (Mar./Apr.
1993). These same students tend to carry over positive behaviors
into their workplaces, after they graduate from college. Blacks and
Whites who attend racially diverse schools, for example, are more
likely to work in racially mixed firms; Blacks who attend racially
diverse elementary schools will more likely have White friends,
live in integrated neighborhoods and judge White co-workers positively. See Marvin P. Dawkins and Jomills Henry Braddock II,
The Continuing Significance of Desegregation:School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J.
Negro Educ. 394, 403 (1994).
Research also shows that a diverse teaching staff reduces the
risk of minority students' suffering from discrimination. See Kenneth J. Meier et al., England, Race, Class, and Education 6 (1989).
White teachers often view minority students less favorably in disciplinary and non-academic settings. See 1 Willis D. Hawley et al.,
Assessment of Current Knowledge About the Effectiveness of
School Desegregation Strategies 86-87, 89 (1981) ("Vanderbilt
Study"). Furthermore, earlier studies concluded that minority
teachers generally give more attention to minority students and
are less likely to place minority students in lower tracks than
white teachers are, see id. at 87, and that Black teachers generally
have greater expectations for Black students than do White teachers. See id.
A very recent study examining the effects of race and gender
on elementary teachers' perceptions of students' behavior and social skills found that White female teachers rated Black male students significantly lower than White female and male students and
Black female students. See Xue Lan Rong, Effects of Race and
Gender on Teachers' Perception of the Social Behavior of Elemen-
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tary Students, 31 Urb. Educ. 261, 276-279 (1996). The author of
this study concluded that the rating was due in large part to perceptions of the White female teachers because White male and
Black male teachers' responses to the same students did not show
such a significant divergence in rating of Black male students. See
id. at 279. Other research confirms that while desegregation has
significantly raised test scores of Black students, Black students
achieve better in desegregated schools when there are more Black
teachers in the school. Robert L. Crain, The Research on the Effects of School Desegregation,in Brown Plus Thirty 40, 40-41 (Lamar P. Miller ed., 1986).
Because of the overwhelming consensus of educators, rooted in
practical experience and social-science research, that a diverse
faculty has substantial educational benefits for students and
faculty alike, I believe that there exists a compelling governmental
interest in achieving and maintaining diversity in the teaching
staff of the Business Department at Piscataway High School.
I am particularly comfortable with this decision because the
method used by the Board of Education was narrowly drawn to
achieve its purpose. For example, the method used in this case
makes race even less important than the plus factor we approved
in Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 13 In
Johnson, the lower court made a factual determination that Diane
Joyce, the woman who was selected for the job in question, was
slightly inferior to her competitor, Paul Johnson. Thus, in that
case, sex was used to boost Joyce's criteria above those of John13. There is an issue before this Court as to whether Title VII places greater
limitations than the Equal Protection Clause on public institutions implementing
affirmative action plans. A principled reading of Johnson, however, demonstrates
that no Justice of this Court believed that Title VII would impose greater limitations than the Equal Protection Clause. In fact, a number of Justices in Johnson
expressed the belief that Title VII imposed fewer restrictions than the Equal Protection Clause on public officials implementing voluntary affirmative action programs. See 428 U.S at 627-628 n. 6. Petitioner does not ask us to hold that Title
VII imposes a lesser limitation on public institutions than does the Equal Protection Clause. It merely argues that the Court of Appeals' implication that Title VII
imposes greater limitations on public employers than the Equal Protection Clause,
91 F.3d at 1559-1560, is erroneous. See Reply Brief at 13. We hold that the standards under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII are the same for voluntary
race-based affirmative action decisions and that Title VII imposes no greater limitation than does the Equal Protection Clause. We do not reach the question of
whether a lesser standard may be applicable to private employers.
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son. 14 In this case, however, race was not used as a plus factor. It
was given even less weight than that. Before the Board considered
race, it found that both candidates were equal in seniority and
qualifications. This finding, affirmed by the lower court, has not
been challenged on appeal. Thus, the Board of Education merely
considered race to break a tie once the candidates were determined
to be equal.
Wygant is also distinguishable. In Wygant, the voluntary plan
required the layoffs of more senior White faculty before the less
senior Black faculty members were laid off. This program affected
a considerable number of faculty members who had greater seniority than those who were retained. Here, the layoff was of only one
faculty member; both Taxman and Williams were hired on the
same day and they were judged equal in qualifications by the
Board of Education.
The Board action in this case resulted from a compelling justification-faculty diversity in a public school setting. The means
used to further this interest were the narrowest means available to
the Board of Education. Although Respondents would have us condemn the policy because it is open-ended and has no fixed stopping
point, the facts in this case demonstrate that the Board used the
policy judiciously. It applied its policy only once in making an individual personnel decision and before it took race into account, it
made a separate determination that the candidates for layoff were
equal. Moreover, requiring a policy whose justification is to acquire and maintain diversity within the school district to have an
ending point makes no sense. It is the very future-oriented purpose
of the policy that requires the policy to be open-ended. Since we are
not passing judgment on the application of the policy on any occasion but the one before us, we are convinced that this race-based
decision would pass muster under the Harvard plan.

14. This determination appears, however, to be false. For an interesting account of the facts in the Diana Joyce case, see Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging
Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A CriticalPerspective on the Distinction
Between Colorblindand Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 Ariz.
L. Rev. 1003, 1032-36 (1997).
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JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBERG joins,
concurring.
I join the Court's opinion, but write separately to emphasize
my continuing disagreement with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476
U.S. 267 (1986), I explained that "race is not always irrelevant to
sound governmental decisionmaking." Id. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I continue to believe that government can and should
take race into account for future-oriented benign reasons and that
the standard the law applies to race-based classifications should
recognize the difference between those granting an opportunity to
persons who are members of groups that have suffered historically
from discrimination and invidious race-based classifications that
favor the group in power. As I stated in Adarand, "[ilnvidious discrimination is an engine of oppression, subjugating a disfavored
group to enhance or maintain the power of the majority. Remedial
race-based preferences reflect the opposite impulse: a desire to foster equality in society." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
For example, I agree, for the reasons expressed in JUSTICE
GINSBERG'S concurring opinion today, that achieving and maintaining diversity on a high school teaching staff is a legitimate reason for a race-based personnel policy.
Moreover, there are other legitimate reasons for taking race
into account. Post-secondary education may legitimately employ
race-based admissions policies. These policies can guarantee diversity of experiences and viewpoints, leading to a "robust exchange of ideas." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 (1978) (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.
Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). Race-based personnel policies
may lead to increased prison safety or peace in a racially divided
community. Cf Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 921 (7th Cir. 1996)
(stating that boot camp can legally take race into account in
staffing).
Finally, race-based personnel policies may prevent future discrimination against persons who are members of a historically disadvantaged group, whether that discrimination be conscious or
unconscious. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A CriticalPerspective on the Distinc-
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tion Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making
Under Title VII, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1003, 1048-1051 (1997).
Because I believe that an "'examination of the legislative
scheme and its history,' . . will separate benign measures from
other types of racial classifications," Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
Federal Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n. 12 (1990)
(quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n. 16 (1975)),
I believe that our standard of review should distinguish between
benign and invidious race-based classifications. For this reason, I
would apply intermediate scrutiny to a benign race-based classification as we did in Metro Broadcasting,497 U.S. at 564-565. To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the racial classification must serve
important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. Id. at 565.
I am concerned that applying strict scrutiny to benign classifications may lead to pernicious results. For example, I believe that
the use of strict scrutiny will create a chilling effect on government-sponsored affirmative action programs, even programs that
would be found legitimate when examined with the strictest scrutiny. In order to avoid the costs of increased litigation, Boards of
Education will, for example, avoid legitimate affirmative action
programs designed to promote diversity or even to remedy prior
discrimination.
Furthermore, because gender-based classifications are subject
to intermediate scrutiny, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515
(1996), it would be very odd to subject a benign gender-based classification to strict scrutiny. If benign gender classifications are not
subject to strict scrutiny, however, the very same affirmative action programs designed to benefit both women and persons of color
may be struck down when they benefit persons of color but upheld
when they benefit women. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 247 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). This is an anomalous result under Title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause since the primary purpose of their passage was to ensure racial equality.
.

This said, we are limited by stare decisis to adhere to our decision in Adarand, which makes clear that the reviewing court must
scrutinize any race-based classification, whether invidious or benign. Strict scrutiny requires a searching inquiry into the objec-
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tives of the classification and the method used to acquire those
objectives. I agree with the Court that Adarand permits, even requires, us to consider who will benefit and who will bear the burden of the classification as part of that scrutiny.
The objective of the Piscataway Board of Education was legitimate and compelling here. A diverse public high school faculty, as
the Court's opinion demonstrates, enhances the education of its
students, preparing them for citizenship in a pluralistic society. In
Wygant, I explained the importance of having a diverse faculty
teach our children:
In the context of public education, it is quite obvious that
a school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated
faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body
that could not be provided by an all-white, or nearly allwhite, faculty. For one of the most important lessons that the
American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and national backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous "melting pot" do not identify essential
differences among the human beings that inhabit our land. It
is one thing for a white child to be taught by a white teacher
that color, like beauty, is only "skin deep"; it is far more convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during
the routine, ongoing learning process.
476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Piscataway Board of Education applied its affirmative action plan only once it had made the determination that
the two candidates for layoff were equal in seniority and qualifications. This plan, therefore, is limited in scope and does not unnecessarily trammel on the rights of white teachers.
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE KENNEDY joins, dissenting.
Because this case involves a layoff, I believe that Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267 (1986), is controlling and we
should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. As we stated
in Wygant:
We have previously expressed concern over the burden that a
preferential-layoffs scheme imposes on innocent parties ....
In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne
by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent
among society generally. Though hiring goals may burden
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some innocent individuals, they simply do not impose the
same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.
Id. at 282-283 (citations omitted).
For this reason, I dissent.
JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins,
dissenting.
As I made clear in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995), there can never be a compelling state interest in
discriminating against individuals to make up for past racial discrimination. I stated:
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the
most admirable and benign of purposes-is to reinforce and
preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the
eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
There is even less of an interest in making personnel decisions
in order to achieve diversity in a department of a high school in a
school district that has never discriminated against Blacks.
For this reason, I dissent.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
I dissent. Government-sponsored racial classifications,
whether they be "benign" or not, are morally reprehensible and unconstitutional. As I stated in Adarand Constuctors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200 (1995):
[Tihere can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as
any other form of discrimination. So-called "benign" discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have
been wronged by the government's use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may
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cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude
that they are "entitled" to preferences.
Id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).

